Computational Program Dependence Graph and its Application to Information Flow Security by Mu C
  
COMPUTING 
SCIENCE 
Computational Program Dependence Graph and its Application to 
Information Flow Security 
 
 
Chunyan Mu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES 
 
No. CS-TR-1270 August 2011 
TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES 
              
 
No. CS-TR-1270  August, 2011 
 
Computational Program Dependence Graph and its 
Application to Information Flow Security 
 
C. Mu 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper develops a novel approach that analyses dependencies of programs in a 
quantitative aspect. We introduce a definition of Quantitative Program Dependence 
Graph (QPDG) which can be used to model a program's behaviour given spaces of 
inputs. The programs we consider are in a core while-language. We also present the 
semantics for the purpose of building QPDGs. The QPDG reasons about the 
programs' quantitative uncertainty behaviours based on a probabilistic analysis. It can 
be used to characterise dependence analysis of programs in a quantitative way. We 
next provides a further optimisation on the QPDG by doing slicing in order to 
perform an information flow analysis, e.g. how input variables at the source node 
might affect a given output variable at the target node and how much. Finally, we 
suggest its application to quantified secure information flow analysis for programs, 
and show that simple and intuitive computation can be obtained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2011 Newcastle University. 
Printed and published by Newcastle University, 
Computing Science, Claremont Tower, Claremont Road, 
Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, England. 
Bibliographical details 
 
MU, C. 
 
Computational Program Dependence Graph and its Application to Information Flow Security  
[By]  C. Mu 
Newcastle upon Tyne: Newcastle University: Computing Science, 2011. 
 
(Newcastle University, Computing Science, Technical Report Series, No. CS-TR-1270) 
 
Added entries 
 
NEWCASTLE UNIVERSITY 
Computing Science. Technical Report Series.  CS-TR-1270 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper develops a novel approach that analyses dependencies of programs in a quantitative aspect. We 
introduce a definition of Quantitative Program Dependence Graph (QPDG) which can be used to model a 
program's behaviour given spaces of inputs. The programs we consider are in a core while-language. We also 
present the semantics for the purpose of building QPDGs. The QPDG reasons about the programs' quantitative 
uncertainty behaviours based on a probabilistic analysis. It can be used to characterise dependence analysis of 
programs in a quantitative way. We next provides a further optimisation on the QPDG by doing slicing in order to 
perform an information flow analysis, e.g. how input variables at the source node might affect a given output 
variable at the target node and how much. Finally, we suggest its application to quantified secure information flow 
analysis for programs, and show that simple and intuitive computation can be obtained. 
 
About the authors 
 
Chunyan Mu received her PhD from King's College London, and is currently a temporary lecture of Computing 
Science at Newcastle University. Her research interests include: language-based security, programming languages, 
information flow security. 
 
Suggested keywords 
 
LANGUAGE 
DEPENDENCE 
MEASUREMENT 
GRAPH 
INFORMATION 
FLOW 
SECURITY 
Computational Program Dependence Graph
and its Application to Information Flow
Security
Chunyan Mu
School of Computing Science
Newcastle University NE1 7RU
chunyan.mu@ncl.ac.uk
Abstract
This paper develops a novel approach that analyses dependencies of programs in a quantitative aspect.
We introduce a definition of Quantitative Program Dependence Graph (QPDG) which can be used to
model a program’s behaviour given spaces of inputs. The programs we consider are in a core while-
language. We also present the semantics for the purpose of building QPDGs. The QPDG reasons about
the programs’ quantitative uncertainty behaviours based on a probabilistic analysis. It can be used to
characterise dependence analysis of programs in a quantitative way. We next provides a further optimisation
on the QPDG by doing slicing in order to perform an information flow analysis, e.g. how input variables at
the source node might affect a given output variable at the target node and how much. Finally, we suggest
its application to quantified information flow analysis for programs, and show that simple and intuitive
computation can be obtained.
Keywords: Language, Dependence, Measurement, Graph, Information, flow, Security
1 Introduction
Program executions contain many dependencies. Dependence analysis between en-
tities is an important part of program analysis. Although the dependence decision
made at two entities of interest is normally treated as a binary decision, the infor-
mation obtained during the dependence analysis can be quantified.
A quantitative analysis of program execution is essential to the system design
process and information flow control mechanisms. A quantitative dependence anal-
ysis can be used to characterise the exact nature of dependencies between state-
ments or variables for program analysis. In this paper, we propose a representation
of the program dependence graph that can be used to capture the properties of
information flow between variables by executing the program. By using the idea of
information theory [18], we compute the quantity of the interference introduced by
data dependence information among variables (which can be with different security
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levels) at nodes of interest. Specifically, we propose to define and build program de-
pendence graphs which leads to a simple algorithm for providing efficient quantified
information flow analysis. As an application, it can be used to provide informa-
tion flow analysis for programs and to measure the information flow between two
components and thus provide an approach in information flow control mechanisms
given a threshold. In the security community, it can be used to capture the infor-
mation flow from high-level private inputs to low-level public outputs by executing
the program, and therefore we can calculate how much information can be learned
about the high security input operation by observing the low-level security output.
The main contributions of this paper are therefore summerised as follows. We
introduce a definition of Quantitative Program Dependence Graph (QPDG), which
can be used to provide a quantitative analysis of dependencies between program
variables by executing the program. We consider a simple programming language,
give the syntax and semantics of the language, describe the QPDG representation for
this language, and construct the dependencies between variables from the syntax
of the program statements. By semantically interpreting the concepts of control
and data dependence, we derive a denotational definition of the control and data
demand generated by variables at program points of interests. We then perform
a quantitative analysis on the QPDG semantics and suggest a method to measure
the dependence between program variables at points of interest by using Shannon’s
information theory. Intuitively, we are particularly interested in which variables
at a source node might affect a given variable at a target node and how much in
information bits (uncertainty measurement). For this purpose, we adapt the PDG
nodes to accommodate the stores and dependencies between variables introduced
by the statement. Furthermore, we give a simple algorithm in order to build a
reduced QPDG which can be used to produce more effective analysis of quantified
dependence and information flow. We also discuss the possible applications of the
reduced QPDG to information flow measurement in the security community.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly goes over the
definitions of PDG, random variables and information entropy. Section 3 defines
the syntax and semantics for a simple while language and semantically describes
the QPDG for this language. In Section 4, we present an algorithm for building
a reduced QPDG to provide a more efficient quantitative dependence analysis and
discuss a possible application to information flow measurement for security. The
final Section summarises our work.
2 Preliminary
In this section, we briefly review some definitions in the relevant background includ-
ing program dependence graph, random variables and program, and information
theory.
2
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2.1 Program Dependence Graph
Many analyses and transformations of programs are based on dependence relations
which are normally represented by program dependence graph (PDG) [6]. The PDG
plays an important role in expressing the essential dependencies of atomic program
operations. We use the dependence graph as our intermediate representation basis.
Intuitively, the dependence graph can be viewed as a data structure in which
edges represent dependencies between operations. Dependence graphs integrate
data and control dependence information into a single structure, making efficient
algorithms for program analysis. Typically, a PDG has two types of dependence
edges: a data-dependence edge and a control-dependence edge. A data-dependence
edge from statement s1 to statement s2 means that the computation performed in
s2 depends on the value computed in s1. A control-dependence edge from s1 to s2
implies that s2 may or may not be executed depending on the boolean outcome of
s1, for instance, a if-statement or while-loop. For every dependence edge in the data
dependence graph, there is a corresponding path in the program dependence graph.
A dependence graph consists of set of nodes representing functional operators and
a set of edges representing the dependencies and precedence relations that exist
between those operations. If there is a dependence between two statements in the
source program, there must be a path between the corresponding nodes in the
dependence graph.
In this paper, we propose to develop a novel representation of PDG that can
be used to capture the quantified dependencies between variables rather than just
the statements themselves. For instance, we are interested in how a specific output
variable at a target node might be affected by a given input variable at a source
node.
2.2 Shannon’s Measure of Entropy
Information theory introduced the definition of entropy, H, to measure the average
uncertainty in random variables. Shannon’s measures were based on a logarithmic
measure of the unexpectedness in a probabilistic event (random variable). The
unexpectedness of an event which occurred with some non-zero probability p was
log2
1
p
. Hence the total information carried by a set of n events was computed as
the weighted sum of their unexpectedness:
H =
n∑
i=1
pi log2
1
pi
where pi log2
1
pi
= 0 if pi = 0. This quantity is called the entropy of the set of
events.
Considering a program as a state transformer, random variable X is a mapping
between two states which are equipped with distributions. We generally use the
language of random variables rather than talk directly about distributions. Let
p(x) denote the probability that X takes the value x, then the entropy H(X) of
3
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discrete random variable X is defined as:
H(X) =
∑
x
p(x) log2
1
p(x)
= −
∑
x
p(x) log2 p(x)
The entropy is measured in bits and is a measure of the uncertainty of a random
variable, which can never be negative. Intuitively, it is the number of bits on the
average required to describe the random variable. Furthermore, given two random
variables X and Y , the notion of conditional entropy H(Y |X) =
∑
x p(x)H(Y |X =
x) suggests possible dependencies between random variables, i.e. knowledge of one
may change the information about the other. The concept of mutual information
is a measure of the amount of information that one random variable contains about
another one, i.e. shared information. It implies the reduction in the uncertainty of
one random variable due to the knowledge of the other. Let p(x, y) denote the joint
distribution of x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , the notion of mutual information between X and
Y , I(X;Y ), is given by:
I(X;Y ) =
∑
x
∑
y
p(x, y) log2
p(x, y)
p(x)p(y)
=H(X)−H(X|Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |X)
There are also conditional versions of mutual information: I(X;Y |Z) denotes the
mutual information between X and Y given the knowledge of Z. The conditional
mutual information can be considered as the reduction in the uncertainty of X due
to knowledge of Y when Z is given:
I(X;Y |Z) =H(X|Z) +H(Y |Z)−H(X,Y |Z)
=H(X|Z)−H(X|Y,Z)
=H(Y |Z)−H(Y |X,Z)
In this paper, we consider program variables as random variables and define the
quantity of dependencies or information flow between program variables by using
the concept of conditional mutual information.
3 The language and program dependence
This section presents the language and semantics to semantically express the depen-
dencies between program variables within program operations. In order to provide
a quantitative analysis of program dependencies between variables for programs,
we consider the program variables as random variables which take probability dis-
tributions as mapped values rather than single values, i.e. there are probability
distributions on the state space rather than just values.
3.1 The language
To simplify our presentation and focus our attention on the problem of quantified
dependence analysis of programs, we consider a simplified language.
4
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The abstract syntax
We present the syntax of the core language in Table 1.
s ∈ Stmt l ∈ Lab x ∈ Ide e ∈ Exp b ∈ BExp n ∈ Num
s ::= cl c ::= (input(x))|(skip)|(x := e)|(s1; s2)|(if b then s else s)|(while b do s)
e ::= x|n|e1 + e2|e1 − e2|e1 ∗ e2|e1/e2
b ::= ¬b|e1 < e2|e1 > e2|e1 = e2
Table 1
The abstract syntax of the language
where s ranges over statements, l denotes a label, x ranges over a set of variables,
b ranges over a set of boolean expressions, and e ranges over a set of arithmetic
expressions.
Semantic domains
Val
df
= µ σ ∈ Store
df
= Ide → Val
δ
df
= P(Ide) ∆l ∈ Dep
df
= P(Ide → δ ∪ Val)
where Val is a probability space µ; σ ∈ Store is a state which maps Ide to prob-
ability spaces; δ denotes a set of program variables (a given expression evaluation
depends on); ∆l denotes a superset of the dependencies between variables for a state-
ment with label l, each of which can be treated as a function of type x → δ ∪ Val
where x ∈ Ide: variable x depends on a set of variables in δ or Val for (random
inputs) by executing the statement with label l.
The semantics
Denotational semantics is closely related to dependence analysis. We want to
reformulate the probabilistic denotational semantics [11] so that the dependencies
can be extracted and recorded for the program. The assignment is ignored unless
it affects the visible contents of the program store. A definition of our denotational
semantics is given in Table 2.
An arithmetic expression Exp is a function [[e] : σ → Val by using two’s-
complement interpretations of +,−, ∗, / as standard. Let δ(e) denote a set of
variables on which evaluating e depends, i.e. the value of [[e] depends at most
on the variables in δ(e). A boolean expression BExp is interpreted as a function
[[b]] : σ → σ. The function defines the part of the store matched by the condition b.
In addition, the value of [[b] depends at most on the variables in δ(b). For example,
assume the current store is
σ
(
x 7→
[
0→ 14 , 1→
1
4 , 2→
1
4 , 3→
1
4
])
and consider boolean expression b is [[x > 1]], we have δ(b) = {x} and the updated
store under condition b as:
σ
(
x 7→
[
2→ 14 , 3→
1
4
])
5
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[[s]] : Stmt → (Store → Store)→ (∆→ ∆)
[[e]] : Exp → (Store → Val)→ δ
[[b]] : BExp → (Store → Store)→ δ
[[input(x)]]l σl∆l
df
= σl(x 7→ µx)∆l(x→ µx)
[[x := e]]l σl∆l
df
= λW.σl([[x := e]]
−1
l (W ))∆l(x→ δ(e))
[[s1; s2]]l σl∆l
df
= [[s2]] ◦ [[s1]]σl∆l
[[ifb then s1 else s2]]l σl∆l
df
= ∆l({x→ δx ∪ δ(b)|x ∈ Def(s1)})[[s1]] ◦ [[b]]σl∆l
⋃
∆l({x→ δx ∪ δ(b)|x ∈ Def(s2)})[[s2]] ◦ [[¬b]]σl∆l
[[while b do s]]l σl∆l
df
= ∆l({x→ δx ∪ δ(b)|x ∈ Def(s)})
[[¬b]](limn→∞(λσ
′
l∆
′
l.σl∆l
⋃
[[s]] ◦ [[b]](σ′l∆
′
l))
n)(λσl∆l.⊥))
where, [[b]]σl = λX.σl(X ∩Mb)
Table 2
Denotational Semantics of Programs
The semantics is a store transformer carried program dependencies. The mean-
ing of a statement s is not a transformer of the entire input store σ but a transformer
only of the part of the store consisting of the variables that are defined in s. In
addition, the store is a map from the variables Ide to a probability space µ rather
than from variables to their values. For a given Stmt s, Def(s) returns the superset
of all variables that may be assigned to. Given a label l, ∆l returns the superset
of maps: P(Ide → δ ∪ Val) which constitute dependencies for the Stmt with that
label. Specifically,
• Random input input(x) assigns a probability space µx to x, and builds a depen-
dence relation such that variable x depends on the input space: Valx = µx,
∆l(x→ Valx).
• Assignment updates the store such that the state of assigned variable x is updated
to become that of expression e, and updates the dependence such that x depends
on δ(e): ∆(x→ δ(e)). The distribution transformation function for assignment is
presented by using an inverse image: λW.σ([[x := e]]−1l (W )) to keep the measura-
bility of the semantic function [11]. For all measurable W ∈ σ′, [[x := e]]−1
l
(W ) is
measurable in σ, where σ and σ′ denote the state before and after the assignment
operator.
• The distribution transformation function for the sequential composition operator
is obtained via functional composition:
[[s1; s2]]lσl∆l = [[s2]] ◦ [[s1]]σl∆l
Note that ∆ is a binary relation on variables. The relational composition is
considered as follows: assume δx denotes the set of variables that x depends on
by executing the statement s1, δy denotes the set of variables y depends on by
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executing the statement s2, assume x ∈ Def(s1), y ∈ Def(s2)
[[s1]]∆l=∆
′
l({x→ δx | x ∈ Def(s1)})
[[s2]]∆
′
l=∆
′
l({x→ δx | x ∈ Def(s1) ∧ x /∈ Def(s2)}) ∪
∆′′l ({y → (λx.δy)δx | y ∈ Def(s2), x ∈ Def(s1)})
where we use (λx.δy)δx = [δx/x]δy to indicate that all occurrences of x in δy are
substituted by δx. We therefore write that,
[[s1; s2]]l∆l = ([[s2] ◦ [[s1])l∆l
= [[s2]∆
′
l({x→ δx | x ∈ Def(s1)})
=∆′l({x→ δx | x ∈ Def(s1) ∧ x /∈ Def(s2)}) ∪
∆′′l ({y → (λx.δy)δx | y ∈ Def(s2), x ∈ Def(s1)
• The boolean function [[b]] for boolean test b defines the part of the space defined
in the current store matched by the condition b: [[b]]σ = λX.σ(X ∩Mb). The
boolean test causes the space to split apart, X∩Mb denotes the part of the space
which leads boolean test b to be true. We use δ(b) to denote the set of variables
that valuating b depends on.
• A Conditional statement is executed on the conditional probability distributions
for either the true branch or false branch:
∆l({x→ δx ∪ δ(b)|x ∈ Def(s1)})[[s1]] ◦ [[b]]σl∆l
⋃
∆l({x→ δx ∪ δ(b)|x ∈ Def(s2)})[[s2]] ◦ [[¬b]]σl∆l
where ∆l({x → δx ∪ δ(b)|x ∈ Def(s1)}) means that, ∀x ∈ Def(si) and i = 1, 2,
we update the dependence relation of x by union δ(b), where Def(si) denotes a
set of variables are assigned to during evaluation of the statement si, δx denotes
the set of variables that x depends on in ∆l after executing [[si]], i.e. [[si]] ◦ [[b]]∆l.
For instance, consider a piece of program with an if statement:
[[if (x > 1) then y := y− 1 else y := y+ 1;]]l
Assume the space of x, y at the beginning of the program is written as:
σl[x 7→ (0→
1
4
1→
1
4
2→
1
4
3→
1
4
), y 7→ (0→ 1)]
After executing the if statement, according to the semantics, the store is obviously
updated as:
σl[x 7→

 0→
1
4 1→
1
4
2→ 14 3→
1
4

 , y 7→

−1→
1
2
1→ 12

]
and the dependence is updated as:
∆l(y → y ∪ δ(b)) = ∆l(y → {x, y})
i.e.
[[if (x > 1) then y := y− 1 else y := y+ 1;]]lσl∆l
7
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= σl[x 7→

 0→
1
4 1→
1
4
2→ 14 3→
1
4

 , y 7→

−1→
1
2
1→ 12

] ∆l(y → {x, y})
• In the while loop, the state space with distribution µ defined in the current store
goes around the loop, and at each iteration, the remaining part that makes test b
false breaks off and exits the loop, while the rest of the space goes around again.
The output distribution [[while b do s]]lσl is thus the sum of all the partitions
that finally find their way out. In this paper, we only consider terminating loops.
In addition, the dependence representation of while loops is similar to that of the
if statement, {x→ δx∪δ(b)|x ∈ Def(s)}) means that the dependencies introduced
by the loop: the depending variables of the defined variables in the loop body are
updated by union δ(b).
3.2 Quantitative program dependence graph
A program dependence graph defines a partial ordering on the statements and the
program performance to preserve the semantics of the original program. For our
purpose of quantitative analysis on program dependencies, we introduce a definition
of quantitative program dependence graph based on the semantics defined in Section
3.1. A quantified program dependence graph consists of a set of nodes representing
atomic computations (assignments and predicate expressions) with current stores
regarding to σ and a set of edges representing the dependencies regarding to ∆.
There are some differences between our QPDG and the standard PDG.
• Rather than considering dependencies between statements, we consider the de-
pendencies between variables.
• The node of the QPDG is labelled by program statement blocks (which can be
assignments, if statements, while loops): Block ∈ P(Stmt). Each node accom-
modates the stores which records the states of each variable obtained from the
stores σ and the dependence relations defined in ∆ given by the semantic func-
tions. Intuitively, the node of the QPDG can be viewed as a transformation box,
which accommodates a statement block with label l, a set of entry ports and a
set of exit ports, and a set of directed internal edges between entry ports and exit
ports of the node. Each entry port stores the state of a “will-be-used” variable
within the block before executing the statement block. Each exit port stores the
state of each defined variable within the node after executing the statement block.
• Directed internal edges between entry ports and exit ports of a node are used for
connecting multiple pairs of variables according to their dependencies obtained
from ∆ within the node. The dependence (denoted by an internal edge) between
each pair is introduced by executing the statement block accommodated at this
node. We give a definition of the quantity of the internal dependence edge based
on conditional mutual information which will be discussed later.
• External dependence edges are essentially data dependence edges between two
nodes. It starts from an exit port (accommodates a defined variable and its
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state) of a node and ends at an entry port (accommodates a used variable and
its states) of another node, and denotes that there is a precedence relation and a
data dependence relation between these two variables at these two nodes.
Example 3.1 Consider a piece of program
[[input(x) l1 ; y := 0 l2 ; if (x mod 2 == 0) then y := y − 1 else y := y + 1 l3 ]]
Assume the state of x is σl1 [x 7→

 0→
1
4 1→
1
4
2→ 14 3→
1
4

] given by input(x). We present
the QPDG of this example in Fig. 1 to show some intuition of the graph.
Fig. 1. A simple example of QPDG: the graph
We present the elements of the graph for this example in Table 3.
semantic blocks entry ports exit ports dependencies ∆
input(x) Valx x 7→

 0→
1
4 1→
1
4
2→ 14 3→
1
4

 x→ Valx
y:=0 Valy y 7→ (0→ 1) y → Valy
if (x%2 == 0)
then y:=y-1
else y:=y+1
x 7→

 0→
1
4 1→
1
4
2→ 14 3→
1
4


y 7→ (0→ 1)
y 7→ (−1→ 12 1→
1
2
) y → {x, y}
Table 3
A simple example of QPDG: the nodes
Intuitively, each node is a transformation box with two sides of “ports”: entry
ports and exit ports. Each entry port accommodates a “will-be-used” variable with
its state before executing the statement block. Each exit port accommodates a
“defined variable” with its state after executing the statement block. If there is an
internal connection between at an entry port and an exit port within the box then
9
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there is a dependence between them which is introduced by the statement of this
node. For instance, the internal dependence edges with the node of if statement
means the definition of y in the if statement depends on variables x and y according
to the semantics. Let q(∆l3(y → x)) denote the quantity of the dependence between
the variable y and the variable x, then
q(∆l3(y → x)) = I(Y
′;X|Y ) = I(Y ′;X) = H(Y ′) = 1
where X,Y, Y ′ denote the random variables of the variable x at entry port before
executing the program, program variable y at the entry port (before executing the
program), and program variable y at the exit port (after executing the program).
In addition, the external data dependence edge between the node of input(x) and
the node of if statement suggests the used variable x at the if statement node (entry
port) depends on the defined variable at the node of input(x) (exit port).
We now present the definition of quantitative program dependence graph as
follows.
Definition 3.2 Quantitative program dependence graph (QPDG). A QPDG is de-
fined as a pair:
QPDG = (N,Ex)
where,
• N = P(Stmt, Pentry, Pexit, Ei) is a power set of tuples of executable statement
boxes each of which accommodates a statement Block (which can be an assign-
ment, if statement, or while loop), a set of entry ports Pentry and a set of exit
ports Pexit, and directed internal dependencies edges denoted by Ei.
· Each entry port accommodates a used variable with its the state defined in σ
before executing the statement Block.
· Each exit port accommodates a defined variable with its state of each variable
after executing the statement Block.
· Directed internal edges Ei between entry ports and exit ports connects multiple
pairs of variables which can be extracted from their dependencies defined in ∆
by the semantics. Specifically, Ei is a set of directed edges inside the nodes.
Each edge e ∈ Ei is a tuple (pentry, pexit, qe), where pentry ∈ Pentry, pexit ∈
Pexit, and qe denotes the quantity of e. Let X denote the random variable
locates at Pentry, and Y
′ be the random variable locates at Pexit, and Z denote
the joint random variable of a set of variables locate in Qentry = Pentry/Pentry,
and there exists an internal edge e′ ∈ Ei, qentry ∈ Qentry, and e
′ 6= e where e′ =
(qentry, pexit, qe′). Intuitively, each internal edge connects an entry port which
accommodates a variable used in the node and an exit port which accommodates
a defined variable in the node. Note that the internal data flow edges Ei implies
the dependencies introduced by the statement block of the nodes and the node
can be nested regarding to the nested if statements and while loops.
• Ex is a set of directed external edges among the nodes. Each edge of Ex starts
from an exit port of one node m and ends at an entry port of another node n.
Specifically, a defined variable at node m is used at node n, where m,n ∈ N .
10
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Intuitively, a data flow edge between nodes actually connects programs variables
and implies a data flow dependence.
Example 3.3 Consider an example program P and its QPDG in Fig. 2.
l1. input(x);
l2. z := 1;
l3. y := 0;
l4. while (x>y) {
y := y+1;
z := z*y;
}
l5. print(y);
Fig. 2. Program P and its qpdg
Assume the probability distribution of possible values of x produced by statement
input(x) is µx : x 7→

 0→
1
4 1→
1
4
2→ 14 3→
1
4

. According to semantic function defined in
Table 2, the transformation of program P1 can be written as:
[[input(x)]]l1σl1∆l1 = σl1 [x 7→
 
0→ 1
4
1→ 1
4
2→ 1
4
3→ 1
4
!
]∆l1(x → Valx)
[[z := 1]]l2σl2∆l2 = σl2 [x 7→
 
0→ 1
4
1→ 1
4
2→ 1
4
3→ 1
4
!
, z 7→ 1→ 1]∆l2(z → Valz)
[[y := 0]]l3σl3∆l3 = σl3 [x 7→
 
0→ 1
4
1→ 1
4
2→ 1
4
3→ 1
4
!
, z 7→ 1→ 1, y 7→ 0→ 1] ∆l3 (y → Valy)
[[while (x > y) do y := y + 1; z := z ∗ y; ]]l4σl4∆l4
= σl4 [x 7→
 
0→ 1
4
1→ 1
4
2→ 1
4
3→ 1
4
!
, z 7→
“
1→ 1
2
2→ 1
4
3→ 1
4
”
, y 7→
 
0→ 1
4
1→ 1
4
2→ 1
4
3→ 1
4
!
]
∆l4 (y → {x, y}, z → {x, y, z})
A translation of the P into the QPDG is presented in the right part of Fig. 2. Let
us consider the node of while loop denoted as nl4 as an example. Obviously,
nl4 = ([[while (x > y) do y := y + 1; z := z ∗ y; ]]l4 , Pentry, Pexit, {ei|1 ≤ i ≤ 4})
where, Pentry = {x, z, y}, Pexit = {x, z, y}. Consider two internal dependence edges
of interest for an example:
e1 = (x, z,
2
3
), e2 = (x, y, 2)
Note that the quantity of internal dependence edge ei is computed by conditional
mutual information as discussed above. For example, the quantity of the dependence
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edge e1 and e2 of interests can be computed by:
qe1 = I(Z
′;X|Y ) = I(Z ′;X) =
2
3
qe2 = I(Y
′;X|Y ) = I(Y ′;X) = 2
where X,Y, Y ′, Z, Z ′ denote the random variables of the program variable x before
executing the loop block, program variable y before and after executing the loop
block, program variable z before and after executing the loop block.
4 Reducing QPDG by Backward Slicing for information
flow analysis
The dependence we concern for information flow analysis relates a variable at one
program point to a variable at another, e.g. we are particularly interested in whether
or not the output variable at target node depends on the input variable at source
node and how much. In this section, we provide a reduction on the QPDG by
doing slicing [20] on it in order to extract the part of a program (the slice) which
is relevant to a subset of the program dependence behaviour of interest. Given the
target output node and source input node of interest, we perform a backward slicing
to chop out the nodes and data flow components without affecting the execution of
the target node. In this way, we chop the program dependence graph to extract the
subgraph of the program that affects the values of the target node and filters the
components of the graphs that do not affect the values of it. Given a source node, if
the source node is not included in the chopped graph, the target node is not affected
by the source node and hence there is no dependence relation between the output
variable at the target node and the input variable defined at the source node. If
both of them are included in the reduced QPDG then the target node depends on
the source node, the quantity of dependence is defined as the conditional mutual
information between the output variable at the target node (assuming that the
relevant random variable is denoted by Y ′) and the defined variable at the source
node (assuming that the relevant random variable is denoted by X) on the condition
of the joint random variables of other inputs (which affect the target node but except
the input variable at source node) denoted by Z that Y ′ depend on: I(Y ′;X|Z).
4.1 Reducing QPDG
In order to consider the quantified dependence analysis between a specific input
variable and a specific output variable and information flow analysis, we reduce the
QPDG based on backward slicing, i.e. we filter the nodes that are not affecting
the output variable at the target point. A backward slice consists of all the nodes
that affect a given target point in the program. In what follows, we present the
description to build a reduced QPDG for our purpose of quantifying dependencies
and information flow analysis.
(i) Given the observed output/observation variable and its output point (the tar-
get node of interest), and the sensitive input variable and its input point (the
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source node of interest). Assume the original quantitative program dependence
graph obtained by the semantics is denoted by G0.
(ii) Doing a standard backward slicing from the observed (output) variable at the
target point: obtain the sets of statements of the program that influence the
value of the observed variable; find all the variables at their definition point
(denoted by Z0 = {(z, n)|n ∈ N, z ∈ Ide}) which affect the final value of the
output variable at the target point: a definition of variable z at node n reaches
the target node. Let G1 denote the graph obtained after doing backward slice.
(iii) If the source node is not included in the obtained graph G1, then there is no
dependence or interference between the the definition of the input variable at
the source node and the observed output variable at the target node. The
algorithm is terminated here and the quantity of the dependence between the
input variable at source and the output variable at target is 0.
(iv) Otherwise, we compute the quantity of the dependence denoted by d between
the relevant random variable defined at source node denoted by X and the
relevant random variable used at the target node denoted by Y ′:
d = I(Y ′;X|Z)
where Z denote the joint random variable of Z0/X, i.e. Z = {(z, n) | n ∈
N, (z, n) ∈ Z0 ∧ z 6= x}.
4.2 Application to information flow security
Information-flow security enforces limits on the use of information propagation in
programs. The goal of information flow security is to ensure that the information
propagates throughout the execution environment without security violations so
that no secure information is leaked to public outputs. Absolute information-flow
properties, such as non-interference [7], are too restrictive and rarely satisfied by
real programs. One promising approach to relaxing non-interference is to quantify
the information flow and to determine how much information is being leaked, thus
allowing us to tolerate “small” leaks. It is desirable to have a quantitative analysis
of the programs to judge whether they are secure or not on the basis of the quantity
of confidential information deducible by the public. Quantitative information flow
(QIF) is concerned with measuring the amount of information flow caused by in-
terference between variables and therefore relaxes the well known non-interference
[7] property by introducing a new policy: the program is secure if the amount of
information flow from confidential inputs to public outputs is not too big.
Assume we have two types of input variables: H(confidential or sensitive) and
L(public). High variables contain confidential information when the program is run.
Low variables do not contain confidential information before the program is run.
The attacker therefore intends to learn about some of the confidential inputs H by
observing the series of low variable outputs L. The confidential information is leaked
to the attacker by examining the interference between the high-level variables and
low-level variables during the execution of the program. We need to verify that the
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final values of variables in L give no information about the initial values of variables
in H. We are also interested in the degree of such interference or information flow,
i.e. how much the high-level components interferes with or flows to the low-level
components.
We argue that the reduced QPDG discussed in this paper can be used to provide
a quantified information flow analysis. The chopped QPDG by doing combined
backward slicing can be used to extract and capture the secure information flow
within the programs. By building a reduced QPDG, we provide a more efficient
quantified leakage analyser: the statements of the program which do not contribute
to bring secure information flows from high input to low output are filtered. In-
tuitively, given two points of interest (high input and low output), the chopped
QPDG consists of those statements that can transmit a change from the source
(high inputs) to the target (low outputs).
Example 4.1 Let us look back the program presented in Example 3.3. Assume x
is high level sensitive variable, y and z are low level variables. Assume the observed
output variable is y. The source node of interest is statement input(x);, and the
target node of interest is the output of y. We present the reduced QPDG in Fig. 3.
Note that the statements not affecting the target node have been filtered.
Fig. 3. Leakage analysis on reduced QPDG
The information flow from high input to low output can be calculated as the
quantity of the dependence between them:
d = I(Y ′;X|Y ) = I(Y ′;X) = H(Y ′) = 2
Obviously, if the quantity of the dependence is 0, there is no information flow
from high input to low output, i.e. the program satisfies non-interference and is
secure. Specifically, the analysed program Sl is considered secure if ∀x ∈ L, there
is no y ∈ H such that ∆l(x→ y).
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5 Related Work
There are a number of techniques have been developed for dependence representa-
tions of programs, e.g. [6,17,19,9] etc. They are difficult to automatically capture
quantified dependence between variables for our purpose of computational infor-
mation flow analysis. Quantitative information flow (QIF) has recently become an
active research topic, e.g. [2,4,12,10,13,1,8,3]. As a precursor of this area, Denning
[5] presented that the data manipulated by a program can be typed with security
levels, which naturally assumes the structure of a partially ordered set. However,
he did not suggest how to automate the analysis. Millen [16] first built a formal
correspondence between non-interference and mutual information, and established a
connection between Shannon’s information theory and state-machine models of in-
formation flow in computer systems. McLean presented a very general Flow Model
in [15]. The main weakness of this model is that it is too strong to distinguish
between statistical correlation of values and casual relationships between high and
low object. McIver and Morgan [14] devised a new information theoretic definition
of information flow and channel capacity. Our method in this paper is more in-
spired by [4,13]: Clark, Hunt, and Malacaria [4] presented a reasonable quantitative
analysis for a particular program in imperative languages but the bounds for loops
are over pessimistic. McCamant and Ernst [13] investigated techniques for quanti-
fying information flow revealed by complex programs by building flow graphs and
considering the weight of the maximum flow over it but this is not a measurement
in information theoretical aspect.
6 Conclusions
We have introduced a definition of quantitative program dependence graph, which
can be used to capture the quantified dependecies of programs given the source
node and target node of interest. We presented the semantics and an algorithm to
build a chopped QPDG, and suggested a method to provide a further abstraction
on the QPDG given the target node and source node by doing backward slicing.
We argued that the reduced QPDG can be applied in the security community to
quantify the information leakage from high level sensitive input to the low level
public output.
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